Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: The Silent Threat to Western Democracies

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: A Silent Threat to the West

Since the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, global attention has been riveted on the battlefield. However, Russia is simultaneously engaged in a second, less publicized conflict: a hybrid war targeting Western democracies. According to Eastern Europe expert Franziska Davies, this conflict is characterized by its elusive nature and encompasses various tactics that do not involve direct military engagements. The overarching aim of these operations is to undermine and destabilize Western societies.

One striking instance of Russia’s hybrid warfare was recently revealed: a conspiracy to assassinate the CEO of Rheinmetall, a prominent German automotive and arms manufacturer headquartered in Düsseldorf. This plot, reported by US broadcaster CNN, is part of a broader scheme aimed at attacking executives from European defense firms involved in supplying weapons to Ukraine.

Davies elaborates on Russia’s ambitions, stating, “What Russia ultimately strives for is a Europe where it can impose its will without regard for international laws and norms—where power is exercised through force.”

The Pervasiveness of Disinformation

Experts categorize Russia’s hybrid warfare strategies into several components, including cyberattacks, targeted harassment of individuals, and widespread disinformation campaigns. Tapio Pyysalo, Head of International Relations at the European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats, emphasizes that “we are all targets of these influence operations.”

As Europe approaches its elections in June, a coordinated effort has emerged to disseminate pro-Russian, anti-vaccine, and anti-LGBTQ narratives across social media platforms. Research conducted by the Dutch institute Trollrensics has uncovered a significant disinformation campaign in Germany that promotes content favorable to the far-right political party Alternative for Germany (AfD). The patterns suggest that the bots responsible for this content may originate from Russian or pro-Russian groups.

Although many European nations have enhanced their defenses against hybrid threats since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Pyysalo warns that effective data sharing among countries is essential for better preparedness. However, such collaboration often intersects with national security laws, complicating the process. “Democratic states must strengthen their legislation to close the loopholes exploited by hybrid actors,” he asserts.

Identifying and Combatting Disinformation

One crucial response to disinformation is to actively recognize and refrain from sharing false narratives, according to Pyysalo. “Everyone has a role to play in verifying information and ensuring that what they disseminate is grounded in facts rather than misleading narratives.”

Dr. Frank Sauer, a security policy expert at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, notes that Russian disinformation campaigns often follow recognizable patterns. “Whether discussing the downing of MH17 or the bombing of a children’s hospital in Kyiv, the sequence is consistent: initial denial, blame-shifting, and eventual admission paired with justification,” he explains.

To counter these disinformation efforts, it is essential to check whether other reputable media outlets have independently verified the information. Additionally, examining the source of the news—such as the credibility of the social media profiles involved—can be revealing. A Ukrainian Ministry of Defence manual on debunking fake news highlights that suspicious profiles often feature random combinations of numbers and utilize outdated or generic images sourced from Google.

Sauer contends that the ultimate goal of Russia’s disinformation tactics is to instill a sense of helplessness, convincing individuals that they can never ascertain the truth. “In Ukraine, many businesses rely on emergency generators, a capability that other European nations may lack,” he cautions. “Hybrid attacks can extend beyond the virtual realm, targeting critical infrastructure.” He adds that similar assaults on energy systems in Ukraine could occur elsewhere in Europe, urging preparedness for potential disruptions in essential services and food supplies. “Be prepared for the worst, but of course, hope for the best,” he summarizes.

Germany’s Vulnerability and the Need for Preparedness

Germany, as Europe’s largest economy, finds itself particularly vulnerable to a range of suspected Russian attacks. According to Sauer, the most alarming scenario would be a total power blackout. “The general populace is ill-prepared for such events. We tend to assume that services will function seamlessly—food will always be available, water will flow from taps, and the weather will remain favorable,” he remarks.

The German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance has initiated steps to compile supply lists, recommending that individuals stockpile enough food for ten days, along with two liters of liquid per person per day. Additionally, citizens are advised to maintain emergency first-aid kits and keep important documents organized for quick access during a crisis.

Building Civil Resilience

Sauer argues that in the face of potential crises, fostering civil resilience should take precedence over military enhancements. “We need to cultivate a reserve of citizens capable of responding effectively in emergencies. We require individuals adept at practical tasks, such as filling sandbags or operating emergency generators,” he explains.

In Germany, the focus should be on ensuring that during emergencies, communities can organize support so that everyone has access to warmth, children have safe spaces to play, and essential services like mobile phone charging and food preparation can be maintained. Importantly, Sauer emphasizes that these preparations are vital not only in the event of external attacks but also in response to challenges posed by the climate crisis.

His hope is for a widespread societal consensus on the importance of investing both financial resources and time into community resilience. This could involve citizens engaging with organizations such as the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, local fire brigades, the Red Cross, or even the German Armed Forces. “We must equip ourselves with the knowledge and skills to tackle disruptions within our communities,” he concludes.